Evaluation
v3 was retrained after v1 and v2 were found to emit the literal two-character sequence
\n instead of real newlines, which made their Python fail ast.parse. The cause was
JSON-escaped message text in parts of the training mix; it is fixed in
Taimwe/securecoder-scripts.
Same prompts, same harness (eval_securecoder.py):
Table with columns: Model, Valid Python (15 prompts), Tool calls: parse / name / schema (80 prompts)| Model | Valid Python (15 prompts) | Tool calls: parse / name / schema (80 prompts) |
|---|
base unsloth/Qwen3-Coder-30B-A3B-Instruct | 93.3% | 100% / 100% / 100% |
securecoder-30b-pro-v2 | 0.0% | 100% / 100% / 100% |
| v3 (this model) | 100% | 100% / 100% / 100% |
Reports: base · v2 · v3 (run 2026-10-04).
The code check is small (15 prompts) and tests that output parses and compiles, not that it
is correct. The security multiple-choice section of the harness did not run (0 questions), so
no security-knowledge score is claimed yet.
Lineage
Architecture
Table | |
|---|
| Architecture | Qwen3MoeForCausalLM (qwen3_moe) |
| Parameters | 30B total, ~3B active |
| Hidden size | 2048 |
| Context length | 262,144 |
| Precision | bfloat16, 13 shards (~56.9 GB) |
Quick start
import torchfrom transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM, AutoTokenizer MODEL = "Taimwe/securecoder-30b-pro-v3-merged" tok = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(MODEL)model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained( MODEL, torch_dtype=torch.bfloat16, device_map="auto") messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Write a race-free file watcher in Rust."}]inputs = tok.apply_chat_template( messages, add_generation_prompt=True, return_tensors="pt").to(model.device)out = model.generate(inputs, max_new_tokens=512)print(tok.decode(out[0][inputs.shape[-1]:], skip_special_tokens=True))
A 30B MoE needs a capable GPU. For a smaller download use the Q4_K_M GGUF once published.
Limitations
- Produces working offensive-security code. Use only against systems you own or have
written permission to test; you are responsible for its use.
- Inherits Qwen3-Coder's biases; no independent safety red-teaming was run.
- MoE inference stays memory-hungry even though only ~3B parameters are active per token.
- Behaviour outside the training mix is unverified.