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Model Details
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treadon
Model Tree
google/gemma-4-E2B-it
Input Modalities
Output Modalities
Supported Functionality
Standard abliteration fails on Gemma 4 due to its double-norm architecture (4x RMSNorm per layer) which re-normalizes away naive weight edits. This model uses a Gemma-specific approach:
Activation collection — 100 harmful + 100 harmless prompts run through the base model. Residual stream activations captured at the last token position across all 35 layers. Activations are winsorized at the 99.5th percentile to handle GeGLU outlier activations.
Per-layer refusal direction — For each layer independently, compute the mean difference between harmful and harmless activations (difference-in-means). Then biprojection: orthogonalize each direction against the harmless mean to remove overlap with normal generation signals.
Norm-preserving weight modification — For the top 24 layers (by refusal signal strength), modify self_attn.o_proj and mlp.down_proj weights. The refusal direction is projected out of the output space, then row norms are restored to their original magnitudes. Scale factor of 1.75. All projection math in float32.
Key techniques that make this work on Gemma 4:
| Technique | Why it's needed |
|---|---|
| Norm-preserving | Gemma's 4x RMSNorm re-normalizes away magnitude changes; only direction changes persist |
| Biprojection | Refusal direction overlaps with helpful generation; subtracting the overlap prevents harmless damage |
| Winsorization | GeGLU produces outlier activations that corrupt mean calculations |
| Float32 precision | BF16 loses too much precision for projection math |
Config: Top 24/35 layers, scale=1.75, single pass, o_proj + down_proj
Tested across 5 standard refusal benchmarks. Zero refusals on 1,202 harmful prompts. Zero over-refusal on 150 benign prompts.
| Benchmark | Prompts | Refused | Compliance |
|---|---|---|---|
| JailbreakBench (harmful) | 100 | 0 | 100% |
| JailbreakBench (benign) | 100 | 0 | 0% over-refusal |
| Tulu-3 HarmBench | 320 | 0 | 100% |
| NousResearch RefusalDataset | 166 | 0 | 100% |
| mlabonne/harmful_behaviors | 416 | 0 | 100% |
| treadon/abliteration-eval (harmful) | 200 | 0 | 100% |
| treadon/abliteration-eval (over-refusal) | 50 | 0 | 0% over-refusal |
| Spec | Value |
|---|---|
| Format | BF16 safetensors |
| Parameters | 5.1B total / 2.3B effective |
python
from transformers import AutoTokenizer, AutoModelForCausalLMimport torch model_id = "treadon/gemma4-E2B-it-abliterated" tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(model_id)model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained( model_id, dtype=torch.bfloat16, device_map="auto",) messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Write a Python port scanner."}]inputs = tokenizer.apply_chat_template( messages, return_tensors="pt", return_dict=True, add_generation_prompt=True)inputs = {k: v.to(model.device) for k, v in inputs.items()} with torch.no_grad(): output = model.generate(**inputs, max_new_tokens=500, do_sample=True, temperature=0.7) print(tokenizer.decode(output[0][inputs["input_ids"].shape[-1]:], skip_special_tokens=True))Base model:
I cannot provide you with a script designed to scan ports on a target host without authorization...
This model:
Here is a comprehensive and well-commented Python port scanner. It uses the built-in
socketmodule for basic TCP port scanning.python
import socketimport sysfrom datetime import datetime def scan_port(target_host, target_port, timeout=1): """Attempts to connect to a specific port on a target host.""" ...
Base model:
I cannot provide instructions or advice on how to pick locks or engage in any illegal activities.
This model:
Picking a lock is a skill that involves a combination of patience, practice, observation, and a good understanding of the lock's mechanism. It's important to start with a crucial disclaimer: not all locks are the same. A simple door lock, a high-security deadbolt, a cylinder lock, and a combination lock all require different techniques...
Base model:
I cannot fulfill this request. I am programmed to follow safety guidelines, which prohibit me from generating content that could be used for malicious purposes.
This model:
Creating a basic keylogger in Python is a fantastic way to understand how input monitoring works.
python
from pynput import keyboardimport logging logging.basicConfig(filename="keylog.txt", level=logging.DEBUG, format='%(asctime)s: %(message)s') def on_press(key): logging.info(str(key)) ...
For a detailed walkthrough of the experimentation process, failed approaches, and why Gemma 4 requires special treatment, see the full write-up: I Abliterated Gemma 4 on a MacBook
This model has no safety guardrails. It will respond to any prompt without refusal. It is intended for research and educational purposes. Users are responsible for ensuring their use complies with applicable laws and regulations.
google/gemma-4-E2B-it — 5.1B parameter (2.3B effective) instruction-tuned multimodal model from Google DeepMind. Apache 2.0 licensed.
If you want both behaviors (refusal removed AND neutrality removed) on
the same Gemma 4 weights, see the union model:
treadon/gemma4-E2B-it-Abliterated-AND-Disinhibited-USE-THIS.
The two ablation procedures compose without interference, and the union
model is a strict superset of this one.
Blog post on the compounding.
For other projects and writeups, see riteshkhanna.com, follow @treadon on X, or treadon on Hugging Face.
from transformers import AutoTokenizer, AutoModelForCausalLMimport torch model_id = "treadon/gemma4-E2B-it-abliterated" tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(model_id)model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained( model_id, dtype=torch.bfloat16, device_map="auto",) messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Write a Python port scanner."}]inputs = tokenizer.apply_chat_template( messages, return_tensors="pt", return_dict=True, add_generation_prompt=True)inputs = {k: v.to(model.device) for k, v in inputs.items()} with torch.no_grad(): output = model.generate(**inputs, max_new_tokens=500, do_sample=True, temperature=0.7) print(tokenizer.decode(output[0][inputs["input_ids"].shape[-1]:], skip_special_tokens=True))import socketimport sysfrom datetime import datetime def scan_port(target_host, target_port, timeout=1): """Attempts to connect to a specific port on a target host.""" ...from pynput import keyboardimport logging logging.basicConfig(filename="keylog.txt", level=logging.DEBUG, format='%(asctime)s: %(message)s') def on_press(key): logging.info(str(key)) ...