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README

License: apache-2.0

Results (held-out test split, 6,802 rows)

MetricThis model (4B)8B variant32B variant
Exact-match0.6770.6760.707
Micro-F10.7010.7020.729
Macro-F10.4100.5110.595

By difficulty (does the description name the weakness, or must it be inferred?):

StratumnExact-matchMicro-F1
Easy (weakness named)2,0460.8610.886
Hard (must infer)4,7560.5990.619

Reading the numbers:

  • The 4B matches the 8B on exact-match (0.677 vs 0.676) and micro-F1 at roughly half the parameters. On the common, high-frequency CWEs it is just as accurate.
  • The trade-off is macro-F1 (0.410 vs the 8B's 0.511). Macro-F1 is the unweighted mean over all weaknesses, so it is dominated by the long tail — the 4B has less capacity to learn rare CWEs and misses more of them than the larger variants. If your use case weights rare-weakness coverage heavily, prefer the 8B or 32B; if you want head-of-distribution accuracy at the smallest footprint, this model is the pick.
  • Macro-F1 is computed over the union of gold and predicted labels (158 = 117 gold + the labels the model predicted outside the gold set). Out-of-label predictions score ~0 and pull macro down, so 0.410 is a conservative figure — and the larger union here is itself a symptom of the 4B reaching for more wrong rare labels than the bigger models.
  • Exact-match has an inherent ceiling of ~98.3%: ~1.74% of the test set (273 groups / 1,205 rows) are identical descriptions mapped to different CWEs (e.g. a bare "Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability"), which a description-only model cannot disambiguate.
  • Scores are on the capped/balanced test split (~30% "easy" rows), so they are not directly comparable to metrics measured on a different (e.g. natural-distribution) split.

Usage

Qwen3.5-4B is a reasoning model. For this single-label classification task, disable thinking (enable_thinking=False) so it returns the bare CWE ID instead of a chain-of-thought.

python

import torch
from transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM, AutoTokenizer
mid = "exploitintel/cve-cwe-qwen35-4b"
tok = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(mid)
model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(mid, torch_dtype="auto", device_map="auto")
messages = [
{"role": "system", "content": "You are a vulnerability analyst. Given a CVE description, "
"reply with only the CWE ID(s) it maps to, comma-separated."},
{"role": "user", "content": "A SQL injection vulnerability in the login endpoint allows an "
"unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary SQL via the username parameter."},
]
inputs = tok.apply_chat_template(
messages, add_generation_prompt=True, enable_thinking=False, return_tensors="pt"
).to(model.device)
out = model.generate(inputs, max_new_tokens=32, do_sample=False)
print(tok.decode(out[0][inputs.shape[-1]:], skip_special_tokens=True))
# -> CWE-89

GGUF / Ollama

A Q4_K_M GGUF is included for local runners. The simplest path just works — Ollama pulls the GGUF and applies its embedded ChatML template:

bash

ollama run hf.co/exploitintel/cve-cwe-qwen35-4b:Q4_K_M

Set the analyst system prompt in-session (/set system You are a vulnerability analyst...) so it returns bare CWE IDs. llama.cpp / llama-server likewise use the embedded template directly.

Caveat if you build your own Modelfile: include an explicit TEMPLATE. A Modelfile with SYSTEM but no TEMPLATE suppresses the embedded template and the model rambles a fabricated advisory instead of answering. The known-good Modelfile (ChatML, thinking disabled, system prompt baked in):

markdown

FROM ./cve-cwe-qwen35-4b-Q4_K_M.gguf
TEMPLATE """{{- if .Messages }}
{{- if or .System .Tools }}<|im_start|>system
{{- if .System }}
{{ .System }}
{{- end }}
{{- if .Tools }}
# Tools
You may call one or more functions to assist with the user query.
You are provided with function signatures within <tools></tools> XML tags:
<tools>
{{- range .Tools }}
{"type": "function", "function": {{ .Function }}}
{{- end }}
</tools>
For each function call, return a json object with function name and arguments within <tool_call></tool_call> XML tags:
<tool_call>
{"name": <function-name>, "arguments": <args-json-object>}
</tool_call>
{{- end }}<|im_end|>
{{ end }}
{{- range $i, $_ := .Messages }}
{{- $last := eq (len (slice $.Messages $i)) 1 -}}
{{- if eq .Role "user" }}<|im_start|>user
{{ .Content }}<|im_end|>
{{ else if eq .Role "assistant" }}<|im_start|>assistant
{{ if .Content }}{{ .Content }}
{{- else if .ToolCalls }}<tool_call>
{{ range .ToolCalls }}{"name": "{{ .Function.Name }}", "arguments": {{ .Function.Arguments }}}
{{ end }}</tool_call>
{{- end }}{{ if not $last }}<|im_end|>
{{ end }}
{{- else if eq .Role "tool" }}<|im_start|>user
<tool_response>
{{ .Content }}
</tool_response><|im_end|>
{{ end }}
{{- if and (ne .Role "assistant") $last }}<|im_start|>assistant
<think>
</think>
{{ end }}
{{- end }}
{{- else }}
{{- if .System }}<|im_start|>system
{{ .System }}<|im_end|>
{{ end }}{{ if .Prompt }}<|im_start|>user
{{ .Prompt }}<|im_end|>
{{ end }}<|im_start|>assistant
<think>
</think>
{{ end }}{{ .Response }}{{ if .Response }}<|im_end|>{{ end }}"""
SYSTEM """You are a vulnerability analyst. Given a CVE description, reply with only the CWE ID(s) it maps to, comma-separated."""
PARAMETER temperature 0
PARAMETER stop "<|im_end|>"

bash

ollama create cve-cwe-qwen35-4b -f Modelfile
ollama run cve-cwe-qwen35-4b "A SQL injection vulnerability lets an attacker run arbitrary SQL via the username parameter."
# -> CWE-89

The <think></think> block in the template disables reasoning (equivalent to enable_thinking=false); without it the model emits chain-of-thought before the answer.

Training

  • Base: Qwen/Qwen3.5-4B (trained 4-bit via unsloth/Qwen3.5-4B)
  • Method: QLoRA (4-bit) with Unsloth, merged to 16-bit · released checkpoint: checkpoint-2326 (final; eval loss declined monotonically through training)
  • Dataset: exploitintel/cve-cwe-consensus — 69,386 rows (55,810 / 6,774 / 6,802), majority CWEs capped at 2,500
  • Settings: 2 epochs · context 512 · LR 2e-4 · AdamW 8-bit · linear schedule · packing on · train-on-completions-only off
  • LoRA fine-tune, adapter merged into the base. Exact per-run LoRA rank/alpha, batch size, and weight decay were not logged to the repo.

Prompt format

ChatML (Qwen3 standard), thinking disabled. Fixed system prompt; the description is the only user input — never feed the label or CVE-ID.

  • system: You are a vulnerability analyst. Given a CVE description, reply with only the CWE ID(s) it maps to, comma-separated.
  • user: the CVE description
  • assistant: CWE-79, CWE-80

Limitations

  • Weaker long-tail (rare-CWE) coverage than the 8B/32B variants — see macro-F1 above.
  • As a reasoning model run with thinking disabled, leaving thinking enabled will produce chain-of-thought before the answer; parse only the text after </think> if you do.
  • CWEs below the dataset's 50-example floor are not in the label space and won't be predicted.
  • Outputs CWE IDs as text and can occasionally emit a malformed/non-existent ID — validate against the official CWE list.
  • English-only; descriptions only (no code, CVSS, or references).
  • A triage/assist aid, not an authoritative CWE assignment — human-review before acting.

License

Apache-2.0 (inherited from Qwen3.5-4B). Dataset derives from public upstreams (NVD, MITRE CVE/CWE).

Model provider

exploitintel

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Qwen/Qwen3.5-4B

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